Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-cjp7w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-30T07:38:21.320Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

John M. Carey
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Matthew Soberg Shugart
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Get access

Summary

EXECUTIVE–LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS

Democratic rule has now lasted nearly forty years in Venezuela, although the system has recently been shaken by a mismanaged neoliberal, austerity package; public riots and military overreaction; two attempted coups; and presidential impeachment proceedings. It is the oldest extant democracy in South America, and as such, it has the longest historical record of currently existing regimes. Brewer-Carías' description of the Venezuelan system, through its own ambiguity, may best capture its mixed nature: el sistema presidential con sujetión parlamentaria, or “a presidential system subject to the parliament” (1985b: 153–190; 1985a: 131). The ambiguity of this phrase accurately reflects the complexity surrounding the president's use of the office's constitutionally allocated powers. In comparative terms the formal powers of Venezuelan presidents are quite minimal, yet it is widely perceived that the president dominates the political arena. An empirical analysis of presidential decree authority helps sort out this apparent contradiction.

In Venezuela the president's formal powers are comparatively few, but a number of factors, in a sense, can magnify their importance. Venezuelan presidents use their nonlegislative decree powers to great effect. They draw attention to and study particular issues, draft legislation, appoint government functionaries, regulate the economy – and they determine the limits of constitutional guarantees. However, they never receive binding legislative powers unless the Congress delegates it to them. So, presidents are always operating within bounds set for them by the legislative branch. Therefore, to understand presidential decree authority, we will have to account for electoral regulations, internal party rules, and the partisan composition of both branches.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×