Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- 55 Strengthening Tax Compliance by Balancing Authorities’ Power and Trustworthiness
- 56 Compliance in Occupational Safety and Health
- 57 Intellectual Property Compliance: Systematic Methods for Building and Using Intellectual Property
- 58 Insider Trading Compliance Programs
- 59 Antitrust Compliance: Collusion
- 60 Understanding AI Collusion and Compliance
- 61 HIPAA Compliance
- 62 Biopharmaceutical Compliance
- 63 Transnational Anti-Bribery Law
- 64 Data Security, Data Breaches, and Compliance
- 65 Doping in Sports: A Compliance Conundrum
- 66 Food Safety Compliance
- 67 Global Supply Chain Auditing
- 68 Corporations, Human Rights and Compliance
- 69 Aiming for Integrity with Integrity
- References
63 - Transnational Anti-Bribery Law
from Part IX - Analysis of Particular Fields
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- 55 Strengthening Tax Compliance by Balancing Authorities’ Power and Trustworthiness
- 56 Compliance in Occupational Safety and Health
- 57 Intellectual Property Compliance: Systematic Methods for Building and Using Intellectual Property
- 58 Insider Trading Compliance Programs
- 59 Antitrust Compliance: Collusion
- 60 Understanding AI Collusion and Compliance
- 61 HIPAA Compliance
- 62 Biopharmaceutical Compliance
- 63 Transnational Anti-Bribery Law
- 64 Data Security, Data Breaches, and Compliance
- 65 Doping in Sports: A Compliance Conundrum
- 66 Food Safety Compliance
- 67 Global Supply Chain Auditing
- 68 Corporations, Human Rights and Compliance
- 69 Aiming for Integrity with Integrity
- References
Summary
Abstract: This chapter focuses on private firms’ compliance with norms concerning transnational bribery. It begins with an overview of the regulatory context and obstacles to effective enforcement of norms against transnational bribery. It then reviews how compliance is defined, how it ought to be defined, and obstacles to the achievement of optimal compliance. Finally, it ends by focusing on the next steps forward in this space: (1) greater information sharing from private firms to outsiders in order to better analyze and evaluate the current efficacy of compliance programs targeting anti-bribery, and (2) increased coordination between enforcement agencies at the national and international levels to better tackle transnational bribery.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 924 - 935Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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