The fall of the Gaillard government in a vote of no confidence on 15 April 1958 exposed the depths of French frustration with the FLN's ability to pursue its fight from the safety of extraterritorial sanctuaries. The French military and security service's invasive attempts at sanctuary denial had failed to eradicate the movement's external organisation. Like the hijacking of Ben Bella and his associates or the Suez intervention that had preceded it, the air strike against Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef of 8 February had backfired on the authorities, provoking international outrage at France's illegal and immoral pursuit of the Algerian war. The Eisenhower administration's attempt to link the resultant Anglo-American good-offices mission between Paris and Tunis with a political solution to Algeria's problems – one that took into account the Algerians’ desire for ‘self-government and self-determination’ – produced an outpour of anti-American sentiments in France. Gaillard's apparent weakness in the face of this pressure proved his undoing. The ensuing contest between liberals willing to pursue a negotiated settlement and hardliners determined to forestall the humiliation of a ‘diplomatic Dien Bien Phu’ climaxed on 13 May 1958, when a memorial service in Algiers for three French prisoners killed by the FLN in retaliation for the execution of three insurgents turned into a riotous demonstration against the investiture as prime minister of the Christian-democrat and colonial liberal Pierre Pflimlin. In a violent reaction against perceived foreign meddling, a mob ransacked the American Cultural Centre before descending upon the Government-General. The military's top commanders in Algiers broke ranks with the government, joining colons (or pieds-noirs) rebels in creating a Committee of Public Safety. Two days later, the Committee's leader, Salan, demanded the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle, if need be by means of a coup d’état.

The May crisis profoundly altered political realities in France and marked a watershed for the Algerian war and indeed for Franco-German relations. At the time, the Adenauer government thought it faced its worst security nightmare: the rise to power of reactionary and xenophobic French forces determined to pursue a policy of national grandeur. How, then, did Bonn react to the unfolding developments, and what impact did the return of de Gaulle have on Franco-German relations?