Introduction

One thing is clear. If people's continued life is not intrinsically and unconditionally good for them then the value of continued life to the people whose life it is cannot underpin the requirement to respect the life of others. The fact that life is a precondition of the value which the content of that life may have is neither here nor there. The requirement to respect the life of others is not subject to the variations which affect the value of the contents of the life of people. Our duty to respect people's life does not vary in scope or strength with variations in the value of the content of the life of those people. Possibly, it is somewhat sensitive to the value of those people's lives. We may not owe the same respect to the life of murderers as to the life of others. Our duty to respect the life of others, however, does not vary in tune with every fluctuation in the value of the contents of the life of those others.

This conclusion is not as worrying as it may appear, if only because it is inevitable for independent reasons anyway. For example, the value of survival to the survivors could at most contribute to an explanation of why we should respect their life. However, when thinking of duties of respect for people the objects of respect are people, not their life.