INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

In “A Problem for Utilitarianism,” Castaneda pointed out a difficulty for traditional formulations of act utilitarianism. A careless reader might think that Castañeda's problem is just a small one of interest primarily to deontic logicians. But that would be a mistake. The problem Castañeda discovered is deep and serious. He showed that act utilitarianism requires a thor-oughgoing reconception.

On traditional formulations, act utilitarianism assumes that there are “concrete acts,” and that most of these are never performed. They remain mere possibilities. Yet these concrete acts are supposed to be the fundamental bearers of normative status. Once we accept this metaphysical assumption, it is quite natural to go on to accept the idea that some of these concrete acts are complex and have simpler acts as parts. The act of tying my shoes this morning had as its parts the act of tying my right shoe and the act of tying my left shoe.

Castañeda discovered that traditional forms of act utilitarianism run counter to deep-seated moral intuitions about the normative status of complex acts and their parts. Suppose that the act of tying my shoes this morning had higher utility than any time-identical alternative. Nothing else I could have done during the same time period would have produced better results. Then act utilitarianism of traditional forms concludes that it was obligatory.