Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- I Truth and Some Philosophers
- 1 Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright
- 2 Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace
- 3 John Searle on Realism and Relativism
- 4 Charles Taylor on Truth
- 5 Daniel Dennett on Intrinsicality
- 6 Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations
- 7 The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism
- 8 Antiskeptical Weapons: Michael Williams versus Donald Davidson
- II Moral Progress: Toward More Inclusive Communities
- III The Role of Philosophy in Human Progress
- Index
8 - Antiskeptical Weapons: Michael Williams versus Donald Davidson
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- I Truth and Some Philosophers
- 1 Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright
- 2 Hilary Putnam and the Relativist Menace
- 3 John Searle on Realism and Relativism
- 4 Charles Taylor on Truth
- 5 Daniel Dennett on Intrinsicality
- 6 Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations
- 7 The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism
- 8 Antiskeptical Weapons: Michael Williams versus Donald Davidson
- II Moral Progress: Toward More Inclusive Communities
- III The Role of Philosophy in Human Progress
- Index
Summary
Michael Williams's Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism offers us something I would not have imagined possible before reading it: a genuinely novel, and very powerful, line of argument against epistemological skepticism. It also purports to show that competing antiskeptical arguments fail. I am enthusiastic about the new antiskeptical weapon that Williams has added to our arsenal, but dubious about his claim that the weapons previously on the market were ineffective. So I shall first try to show off Williams's new weapon in the most advantageous possible light. Then I shall argue that Williams has not shown that there is anything wrong with the alternative weapon purveyed by Donald Davidson, one of his principal competitors in the antiskepticism business. Finally, I shall argue that, although Williams's and Davidson's weapons embody the same basic design, there are reasons for preferring Davidson's version.
Barry Stroud, the leading contemporary exponent of the view that epistemological skepticism is a serious and important issue, says that skepticism “appeals to something deep in our nature.” Stroud tries to show “how closely Descartes’ requirement that the dream-possibility be eliminated corresponds to our ordinary standards or requirements for knowledge in daily life.” He claims that “the sources of Descartes’ requirement. … illuminate something about our actual conception of knowledge.”
Williams rejoins that we do not have an “actual conception of knowledge” to be illuminated. Williams thinks that there is no such thing as “human knowledge” or “our epistemic position” or “our view of reality.” As he puts it, there may be “fewer things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our epistemology” (102).
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- Truth and ProgressPhilosophical Papers, pp. 153 - 164Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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