Indirect rule transferred the struggle to define property rights to the traditional state, but it did not predetermine the outcome of those struggles. The definition and enforcement of property rights in each state were instead the products of (I) the indigenous actors' competition to secure a distributionally favorable definition of property rights, and (2) the interaction between these indigenous actors and the European officials who wielded the coercive authority of the colonial state.

Part II examines the transformation of property rights systems in two traditional states of the Gold Coast Colony: the Ga state and Akyem Abuakwa. In both, indigenous actors responded to the commercialization of land by ‘reinventing tradition. ’ Individuals and groups defined customary property rights systems that gave them privileged access to and control over land; and they reformed traditional state institutions in an effort to enforce those rights. In the Ga state, the elites' endeavor failed, and customary land tenure was both fluid and insecure. In Akyem Abuakwa, however, the elites succeeded. Property rights and custom were fixed and secure.

The analysis of these divergent outcomes raises many of the central theoretical questions introduced in chapter 1. Both case studies confirm the proposition that distributional conflict lies at the core of the institution building process. In both the Ga state and Akyem Abuakwa, elites and non-elites battled one another to define a version of custom that gave them a disproportionate share of society's resources. The resolution of that conflict hinged upon the use of coercive force.