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4 - Crippling Qaddafi and Infighting over NATO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Christopher S. Chivvis
Affiliation:
Rand National Defense Research Institute
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Summary

Leaders from countries supporting the intervention gathered in Paris on March 19, two days after the UN resolution. Over the course of a few short days, the United States and its key allies had committed themselves to war with Qaddafi. Even when the president had told Ambassador Rice to push for a stronger Security Council mandate earlier in the week, it had still been uncertain what the outcome would be. But with the resolution behind them and Qaddafi’s forces at the outskirts of Benghazi, leaders faced immediate pressure for swift military action. The Paris meeting emphasized the leading role France was playing. President Obama had sent Secretary Clinton in stead of himself, to underscore the lesser role of the United States. Meanwhile, in Washington, Secretary Gates delayed a previously scheduled trip to Russia to oversee the initial strikes.

At the request of the State Department, initial military operations were held back until the Paris meeting concluded, to avoid the appearance that military operations had trumped political aims. The delay was not long, however. Sarkozy walked out of the meeting and announced that French Rafale fighter jets (Figure 4.1) had just struck Qaddafi’s forces in Benghazi. Few other leaders were abreast of the French operation, and it looked like a thinly veiled attempt by Sarkozy to boost his domestic approval ratings at the expense of transparency and allied coordination. In response, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi warned that Italy might deny the use of critical Italian bases. According to at least one European diplomat, the move “nearly broke up the coalition.” This was only the beginning of the problem, however. Over the course of the next two weeks, allied tensions peaked as leaders struggled to define the mission and figure out how it was going to work.

Type
Chapter
Information
Toppling Qaddafi
Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention
, pp. 69 - 95
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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