John Dewey observed that “In scientific inquiry, the criterion of what is taken to be settled, or to be knowledge, is being so settled that it is available as a resource in further inquiry; not being settled in such a way as not to be subject to revision in further inquiry” [emphasis in original, Dewey, 1938, pp. 8–9]. Game theory has been successfully applied to the subject matter of general economic theory, particularly for competitive and market-driven scenarios where individual rationality dominates. It is firmly established; it is settled. In fact, it is so settled that it is available as a resource for further inquiry into the issue of multistakeholder decision making for scenarios where social relationships extend beyond self-interest.

The net cast by classical game theory, however, is designed to capture the essential characteristics of multistakeholder decision scenarios where all participants possess categorical (unconditional) preference orderings and are committed to achieving the best individual outcomes for themselves. This book revises game theory to cast a wider net designed to capture, in addition, decision-making scenarios where cooperation, compromise, negotiation, and altruism are significant issues, and where notions of concordant group behavior are important.