Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-m42fx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-17T18:37:46.979Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Chapter Two - Equality and Unsociability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2023

Get access

Summary

‘And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground …’ (Genesis II.7)

HOBBES AND NATURAL EQUALITY

Hobbes’ state of nature was a condition in which human beings were equal in the sense that they had roughly equal powers. This applied to all adult men and women living in the natural condition. Hobbes admitted that there were differences of strength and intellect, but these were ‘not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he’. Differences in physical strength did not affect this equality—one human being might be physically weaker than another, but he still had the ability to kill the stronger individual, ‘either by secret machinations, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself’. Hobbes claimed that little force was necessary in order to kill another human being. And even if an individual had the utmost confidence in his own ability, he could not believe that he was naturally superior to others. Thus, those ‘who have equal power against each other, are equal; and those who have the greatest power, the power to kill, in fact have equal power’. Differences in intellectual ability also did not affect this equality. In fact, according to Hobbes, if we ignored taught intellectual ability such as rhetoric and science, and also intellectual ability, which was attained by experience such as prudence, we found that human beings were equal in ‘the faculties of the mind’. In other words, human beings were equal in those faculties of mind, which they had from birth. The reason for this was that each human being thought he was wiser than others, and this, according to Hobbes, was proof of their equality—they were equal in being contented with their share of wisdom, which they thought was greater than anyone else’s share.

Hobbes’ argument for natural equality was particularly directed against Aristotle, and his followers. Hobbes criticized Aristotle’s claim that naturally some human beings were made to serve because of their physical strength, while others were made to rule because of their intellectual ability.

Type
Chapter
Information
State of Nature or Eden?
Thomas Hobbes and his Contemporaries on the Natural Condition of Human Beings
, pp. 46 - 69
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×