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Competing Diplomacies: Thailand amidst Sino-American Rivalry

from THAILAND

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2015

Pavin Chachavalpongpun
Affiliation:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
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Summary

Thailand's domestic political crisis that began in the final year of the Thaksin Shinawatra administration (2001–06), culminating in the military coup of September 2006 and continuing into the current period of the Democrat-led government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, has also influenced the country's foreign policy, especially its relations with the great powers. The crisis has provided a platform for these powers — in this case, the United States and China — to compete with each other in order to preserve their strategic ties with Thailand at a time when the kingdom has been experiencing political turbulence. It is however necessary to see the role of Washington and Beijing in Thailand's protracted crisis in the wider context of competition for influence and supremacy in Southeast Asia. This chapter examines the different approaches of the United States and China in dealing with the Thai crisis. It asks: Which approach is more effective to win influence in Thailand? It investigates the way in which the competition between the two great powers has come to influence Thailand's foreign affairs. In the final section, the chapter briefly discusses the standing of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Thailand's polarized politics and seeks to elucidate whether Thailand has been able to exploit its position in ASEAN to dilute the power of the United States and China over its domestic and foreign affairs.

The Eagle versus the Dragon

Ian Bremmer has rightly observed that the United States and China are growing dangerously hostile towards one another. He questioned: Could this be worse than the Cold War? The fact that the “list of irritants” in Sino-U.S. relations has grown in past years seems to validate Bremmer's point. For example, throughout 2010, burgeoning bilateral tensions almost led to a trade and currency war. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner claimed that China's refusal to rapidly increase the value of its currency was hurting America's economic recovery. Rejecting the claim, Chinese leaders stressed that the United States was wrong to blame China for its own economic woes. On top of this, the United States accused China of failing to protect the intellectual property of foreign companies.

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Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
Print publication year: 2011

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