Friendly societies internalized responsibility. They survived mainly as cooperative ventures for mutual advantage. That troubles some people, because for them the point of collectivizing responsibility is to externalize it: to break the link between contributing to a cooperative venture and sharing in its benefits. Why? Sometimes externalization is endorsed because it is expected to have good consequences; more often, it is endorsed despite the consequences. It is endorsed as a matter of justice.

Name an institution and someone will endorse it – while someone else condemns it – as a matter of justice. Is there any way to sort out what really merits endorsement as a matter of justice? What would it take to show that internalizing responsibility is unjust?

The Concept of Justice

What is justice? We probably all agree on the basic concept. Although we argue about what justice requires, the very fact that we are arguing presupposes some common understanding. Specifically, if we argue about what is just, we will understand ourselves to be arguing about what people are due. Accordingly, there is such a thing as a general concept of justice. In the most general terms, justice is about people getting what is coming to them. Justice is, analytically, a matter of people getting their due.

We begin to disagree when it comes to specifying exactly what people are due. Following Rawls, we may distinguish between the basic concept of justice – that people ought to get their due – and particular conceptions of what people are due.