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10 - The parental love argument against ‘designing’ babies: the harm in knowing that one has been selected or enhanced

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2014

Anca Gheaus
Affiliation:
Sheffield University
Mairi Levitt
Affiliation:
Lancaster University
Darren Shickle
Affiliation:
University of Leeds
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Summary

In this chapter, I argue that children who were selected for particular traits or genetically enhanced might feel, for this reason, less securely, spontaneously and fairly loved by their parents, which would constitute significant harm. ‘Parents’ refers, throughout this chapter, to the people who perform the social function of rearing children, rather than to procreators. I rely on an understanding of adequate parental love which includes several characteristics: parents should not make children feel they are loved conditionally, for features such as intelligence, looks or temperament; they should not burden children with parental expectations concerning particular achievements of the child; and parental love is often expressed in spontaneous enjoyment and discovery of children’s features. This understanding of parental love provides a reason to question the legitimacy of parental use of selection and enhancement and to explain why parents should not engage on a quest for the ‘best child’.

Introduction

Is there anything morally objectionable about parents trying, with the help of genetic technology, to ensure that their children will have features that are usually regarded as advantageous, such as good looks, exceptional cognitive abilities or sunny temperaments? Given that parents cannot but shape their children in a variety of ways – through deciding on diets, socialisation, education, use of free time and so on – what, if anything, speaks against a parental decision to select or to enhance their future children in medically and morally irrelevant ways?

Type
Chapter
Information
The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know
Genetic Privacy and Responsibility
, pp. 151 - 164
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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