The relationship between the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ would seem to be straightforward enough: according to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the new approach of RtoP recognises the ‘long history’ of the phrase ‘intervention’ and its implications. It represents an attempt to reconceptualise the core issues, changing not only the terminology, but also the perspective. By turning its focus from the concept of ‘intervention’ to the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, RtoP purports to apply the lessons from a very long debate about the legality of ‘humanitarian intervention’ – and avoid its pitfalls.

Accordingly, the concept has not only fuelled academic debate, but has also received the highest praise, being called the ‘most dramatic development of our time – comparable to the Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Convention on Genocide’. The doctrine has also received widespread recognition at the international level, for example through its inclusion in the World Summit 2005 Outcome Document (WSO Document), even if the version recognised there represents only a watered-down version that might be termed ‘RtoP lite’.

Yet, even the most enthusiastic supporter of the concept would have to concede that the recognition of the principle says very little about its implementation in practice. It is, at best, a candidate norm – and in this regard, the ‘new’ approach seems to have had limited impact so far. The following pages will explore whether this could have been expected and whether this might explain why Sudan – one of the states that has been (or should have been) an obvious target state for RtoP-type action in recent years – appeared to have little difficulty supporting the doctrine in principle.

The History in RtoP

Even though it expressly recognises the ‘long history’ of the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention’, the ICISS Report makes surprisingly few references to this history. While there is extensive discussion of a number of ‘non-consensual military interventions’ during the Cold War period (1945-1989) that ‘resulted in clear humanitarian benefits’, and the military interventions of the 1990s with ‘purported humanitarian justifications’, there is very limited reference to the doctrinal history of the phrase. One might find this surprising, given that discussions of the legality of ‘humanitarian intervention’ go to the heart of the conflict between order and justice and are often traced back as far as the writings of Hugo Grotius.