Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-g7rbq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-28T03:48:38.531Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

14 - Freedom of Contract and Freedom of Person: A Brief History of “Involuntary Servitude” in American Fundamental Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2013

Jürgen Heideking
Affiliation:
Universität zu Köln
James A. Henretta
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, College Park
Peter Becker
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Get access

Summary

Liberal ideas are normally taken to have played an important role in the development of free markets, and of free labor based on contract in those markets. A closer look at labor regimes in the nineteenth century, however, reveals that liberal commitments to freedom did not straightforwardly produce what we today would think of as free labor. Just as often they produced a form of coerced contractual labor. And this was quite simply because liberal commitments to freedom embraced a basic conflict between freedom of contract and freedom of person.

To the extent that one possessed absolute freedom of contract, one would have been free to contract away one's personal liberty. One would have been free to contract into slavery or bind one's labor irrevocably for long periods of time. To the extent that the state found it desirable to prevent this result, it could only do so by imposing limitations on the freedom of contract in the interest of preserving the freedom of persons.

Modern free labor is the result of just such a choice to restrict freedom of contract. Before this basic issue within liberalism was finally resolved in favor of freedom of person and against freedom of contract, many of the first market regimes based on free contract produced coerced contractual labor rather than free labor. In the first flourishing of free contract in the nineteenth century, lawmakers in many different countries seem to have believed that labor markets based on promises could only function properly if contracts could be rigorously enforced against workers. As a result they often gave employers harsh remedies for contract breach so that they could compel workers to perform their agreements.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×