Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-cnmwb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T19:25:02.379Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Limitations of regulatory analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2009

Thomas O. McGarity
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
Get access

Summary

The description in Chapter 8 of the virtues of regulatory analysis presents an ideal view of comprehensive analytical rationality. As might be expected, the ideal suffers considerably in the real world where values conflict, the available information is never adequate, and quantitative techniques encounter huge uncertainties. Many students of government urge instead more realistic notions of “bounded rationality”. Because analysis is expensive and information-intensive, decisionmakers, in this view, can only muddle through by exploring a very limited range of options, relying heavily upon intuition and “back-of-the-envelope” predictions, and hoping for rapid feedback to meet limited short-term goals. Critics maintain that politics is inseparable from bureaucratic decisionmaking, and purely instrumental techniques deprive it of an important democratic dimension. One prominent student of the bureaucratic process has observed:

The notion of some analysts that knowledge will carry the day is absurd. Knowledge does not and cannot govern. The diversity of our society and institutions sets the conditions for conflicting values to be maintained. Once we realize that problems of public policy are not solved but adjusted by policymakers, then it should be clear that the degree of trust within our society is equally as important as knowledge.

Regulatory analysts react very negatively to such suggestions, arguing that an informed decision is always better than one made in ignorance. They argue that analysis enhances democratic accountability by forcing agencies to make explicit value choices. Yet, as a purely descriptive matter, the muddling through model often appears to fit the decisionmaking process better than the comprehensive analytical rationality paradigm.

Type
Chapter
Information
Reinventing Rationality
The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy
, pp. 124 - 164
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×