The final empirical chapter turns to the international level in order to determine whether delegation to an international standard-setter alters the regulatory dynamics identified. Looking at the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the chapter asks whether this institution has been able to ameliorate the regulatory biases found domestically. In order to answer this, the chapter replicates the analysis conducted on agrochemical regulation in the United States, this time looking at changes to standards under Codex. The chapter shows that even though Codex standard-setters are substantially more removed from the domestic political process than regulators in the USA, the Codex Commission has shown as much of, if not a greater tendency to systematically impose stricter standards on out-of-patent agrochemical products. As such, the international standard-setter has ended up placing more onerous rules on more affordable products for reasons that are less based on science than they are based on the absence of scientific information. In addition to showing that international standards have been vulnerable to similar biases as domestic regulations, this chapter also explores how developing countries and generic producers have sought to combat the regulatory barriers that have arisen at the international level and how innovative firms have successfully blocked them.