In this chapter, my theme is introspection: how does it function in Plotinus' dialectic, what are some of the philosophical issues associated with it, and most importantly, how does Plotinus think it can be practiced? Plotinus anticipates Descartes in arguing both that the soul as subject of perception cannot be an extended substance and that the mind necessarily knows itself. Like Descartes, Plotinus also invokes an introspective stance within his dialectical procedure. Methodologically, it will be seen, Plotinus shares with Descartes in a tradition of philosophy of mind that employs thought experiments as a method of persuasion. The special nature of this persuasion is effected through the textual representation of a highly structured form of self-reflection. I will be looking at the philosophical appeal to self-reflection, and asking whether and how it informs the contemplative pedagogy of Plotinus. In particular, in order to discuss his views about self-consciousness and self-reflection, I will concentrate upon Plotinus' use of thought experiments.

What does it mean to for someone to be a person – what is the essence of the human self? In the modern, Cartesian tradition, one answer to this question is that the self is the mind, whereas the mind in its turn is a substance uniquely endowed with reflexive consciousness. Recently, historicist challenges to this mentalistic conception of personhood have argued that the ancient Greek philosophers managed their psychology and epistemology quite well without the concept of consciousness.