Introduction

If the arguments examined in the preceding chapter are essentially nonstarters, there are two other, much more substantial and very closely related lines of reasoning that have yet to be considered. The first of these can be characterized as a pragmatic argument, and the second – following a suggestion of Hammond – can be termed a “consequentialist” argument. It is a distinctive feature of each that it can be put to work to support both the ordering and the independence principles. That is, from a consequentialist or pragmatic perspective on foundational issues, the two cornerstones of the modern theory of rational choice are revealed to stand on a par with each other. If either one of these arguments goes through, then the agent who is concerned to maximize with respect to consequences will have good reason to accept both WO and IND. This is rather striking, for historically at any rate the two principles have been regarded as grounded in quite distinct intuitions.

In very general terms, the pragmatic argument seeks to show that failure to accept the ordering and independence principles can work to the practical disadvantage of the agent – to his doing less well (in terms of the promotion of personally defined interests) than he otherwise could have done in a certain class of situations. Arguments of this general sort have surfaced repeatedly in the history of decision theory.