Workmen's compensation laws mark the political origin of institutions socializing risks. In a majority of countries, accident insurance policies were enacted prior to the introduction of social policies compensating against other risks, such as old-age, sickness, or unemployment (Alber 1982: 49).l Institutional solutions that were invented during the policy deliberations surrounding the introduction of this policy - such as the concession of a monopoly over the organization of insurance to the state - served as a blueprint to politicians and lawmakers during subsequent episodes of social policy reform (Ewald 1986).

The political process that led to the introduction of accident insurance differs from the institutionalization of other social risks within the welfare state in one important respect. A crisis of private law served as the catalyst of the process of social policy reform. In the case of the other major social risks - old age, sickness, or unemployment - social insurance was established to complement or replace preexisting institutions and practices of social assistance. In the case of workmen's compensation laws, social insurance emerged as a political solution to the legal crisis of the civil code. At first, political reformers attempted to change the judicial process through which victims of workplace accidents could seek compensation from their employers. These piecemeal attempts at reform exposed the important political limitations of all legal solutions that relied on the principle of individual responsibility as the basis of compensation of the victim of workplace accidents. What began as an attempt to find a new legal justification under private law culminated with the introduction of social insurance.

What was the role played by employers during this episode in the political history of the welfare state? What were the policy demands articulated by different firms? What were the most important issues of policy design that were salient for employers? Can the model developed in Chapter 2 explain the variation in the policy preferences of firms? How influential were employers during these political reforms? What policy and institutional factors enhanced the influence of employers during these deliberations? This chapter examines these questions, by analyzing the role played by French and German employers in the negotiation of accident insurance legislation during the last decades of the nineteenth century.