Background: the defeat, the armistice and the Vichy constitution

In the early summer of 1940 the ‘drôle de guerre’ turned serious. On 13 May German troops, who had evaded the Maginot line by cutting through Belgium, crossed the Meuse. The German army's advance into France proved unexpectedly successful. On 28 May French and British troops had to be evacuated from the encircled pocket around Dunkirk and on 10 June Paris fell. In the immediate aftermath of the war the German success seemed so astounding that many were inclined to attribute it to long-term social decline in France or even to the activities of fifth columnists and anti-republican conspirators. Recent historians have been more inclined to explain the defeat in terms of precise military mistakes and failures of generalship.

However, the political reaction to military disaster certainly did have roots in some of the social and political conflicts that had divided France before the war. Paul Reynaud, the prime minister, was in a weak position; his appointment dated back only to 22 March and he had won a vote of confidence in parliament by only one vote. On 18 May Reynaud appointed Marshal Philippe Petain as vice-president of the council. The eighty-four-year- old hero of Verdun had become a figurehead for those who desired strong government during the 1930s. He was ostensibly brought in to stiffen resolve, but, in fact, he had already decided that France was defeated. The following day Weygand was appointed commander-in-chief over the head of Gamelin. Finally, in the last ministerial reshuffle of the Third Republic, the young military theorist Charles de Gaulle was made under-secretary of state for war on 5 June.