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5 - End games: crisis termination and accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Arjen Boin
Affiliation:
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, The Netherlands
Paul 't Hart
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Eric Stern
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
Bengt Sundelius
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
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Summary

It ain't over till it's over

In July 1995, Bosnian-Serb forces took the town of Srebrenica, a UN safe haven, after a long siege and a brief military campaign. The Dutch military contingent (Dutchbat), which acted as UN protector of the enclave, surrendered and was allowed a safe retreat. The Netherlands sighed with relief that this brush with war had not resulted in a Dutch blood bath. Upon return, the Dutch troops were welcomed as national heroes by their families, the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince. For the Minister of Defense, who had spent several days and nights in “the bunker” where the military commanded the besieged troops, the crisis was finally over.

At least, that is what he thought. Within days, it became clear that the Serbs had committed heinous crimes after taking over the Bosnian enclave. Upon investigating the role of the Dutch men in uniform, media reporters began to assert that they had not done much to defend the enclave. Rumors began to circulate to the effect that the Dutch had condoned and even cooperated with the Serbs in their ethnic cleansing. The world learned that 7,000 men had been murdered, many of them while the Dutch battalion was anxiously awaiting its safe passage home. The Minister of Defense would spend the remainder of his political career defending the decision to surrender and leave. Many investigation reports were conducted (most of which were published), yet doubts lingered on in the public mind.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Politics of Crisis Management
Public Leadership Under Pressure
, pp. 91 - 114
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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