In previous chapters we argued that the empirically successful formalism of quantum mechanics supports equally well two mutually incompatible general ontologies: the inherently indeterministic and generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation and Bohm's completely deterministic one. This underdetermination of the interpretation by the formalism is not simply an apparent one of two equivalent theories since there is no way to translate the terms of one of these ontologies into those of the other. This case could be seen as presenting a challenge to the scientific realist who seeks from successful scientific theories a true representation of the world. Furthermore, we suggest that the actual historical competition between these theories and the selection of Copenhagen over Bohm illustrate that such an historically contingent process is not meaningfully distinct from the rational reconstruction and logical judgment of the victorious theory. What is deemed successful and put on offer by the scientific community for the philosopher of science to justify after the fact is itself a contingent and nonunique product.

UNDERDETERMINATION

The origin of the underdetermination of scientific theories, what we refer to here as the so-called Duhem–Quine thesis, is typically located in Pierre Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (first published in 1906). There Duhem was quite explicit about what he took to be the basis for judging whether or not a given physical theory is acceptable.