Judgement on German economic policy during the great depression has been passed long ago. It is true that there have been repeated attempts to excuse the behaviour of those responsible by explaining it in terms of circumstances or of honourable motives. But the conclusion itself — that the policy represented a series of major mistakes — has as yet scarcely been challenged. This is especially true in the case of German monetary policy, and above all for the sequence of decisions to maintain the gold parity and thus also the parity against the dollar and the French franc. The decision not to alter the old Reichsmark parity against gold after Britain left gold on 20/21 September 1931 ushered in the last and most radical round of Brüning's deflationary policy. It led to the fourth emergency decree of 8 December 1931. The Reich government in any event regarded the enormous effort of the decreed lowering of costs as the German reply to the British measure.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of a critical analysis, it is useful to free oneself from the impression that the decision to adhere to parity virtually and of necessity led to all the subsequent and unsuccessful measures, and in particular to the failure to adopt a more active economic policy.