The previous chapter characterized the Salvadoran and Guatemalan revolutionary movements as failures, which is true by definition if a revolution, or a “successful” revolution, requires the overthrow of the existing state. But there is another side to the proverbial coin: As we have seen, the Salvadoran and Guatemalan states were themselves unable to defeat militarily the revolutionary movements that challenged them. This raises a question that has received relatively little attention in the literature on revolutionary movements (and social movements more generally): Why have certain movements (but not others) been able to persist for many years or even decades, maintaining a significant base of popular support, even when subjected to extraordinary levels of state violence? To address this question, I compare in this chapter cases of “persistent insurgency” in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru (with a glance at Colombia) with major defeated rebellions in Malaya and the Philippines (discussed in Part 2) as well as Venezuela.