In this chapter I hope to show that memory is a key factor in shaping decisions taken in the pursuit of power, but that conversely policy goals have a decisive influence on how memory is constructed. Two different forms of memory should be distinguished for our purposes. First, there are the multitudinous and fragmented memories that individuals may have of events such as the German occupation of France in 1940–5. Such an event may be variously experienced as trauma, loss, hunger, persecution, betrayal, deportation, new-found power or heroic resistance, depending on the individual, and these memories have no unmediated impact on policy-making. Second, there are the myths elaborated by politicians, intellectuals and the media to order and explain those events, and to overcome the pain associated with them. They are myths not in the sense of fictions or fairy-tales but of narratives of the past which serve to give an identity to a collectivity such as the nation, bind it together and legtimate policy decisions taken on its behalf. They constitute what other contributors to this volume refer to as national or collective memory.

Clearly, the main policy objective of a state is security. Among politicians, intellectuals and the media, however, there will be disagreements about the best policy to adopt in order to ensure that security. Some will propose an alliance with a given power, others wariness of it or even war with it.