THIS STUDY AIMS to explore colonial Korea with special emphasis on its foreign relations during the Japanese occupation (1905–1945). Korean “international relations,” strictly speaking, did not exist during this “Japanese” period. Since the nation-state is traditionally a formal actor in international politics, Korea could not qualify for this role after the 1905 Protectorate Treaty that deprived it of the right to represent itself in foreign relations, or after the subsequent annexation in 1910. The 1907 International Conference at The Hague refused to recognize the legitimacy of the delegates of the Korean king, and this refusal formally confirmed Korea's eroding sovereignty. Korea's diplomatic history, in the conventional sense, thus came to a halt in 1905 and entered a political limbo, until it was resurrected with the liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, and the establishment of two independent nations in 1948.

Accordingly, this research essentially deals with Japan's relations with Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain, in regard to Korea; and, in this sense, it is an attempt largely to record the attitudes and policies of these Western powers toward Korea, and to observe Korea through their looking glasses. One might ask whether or not the issue of Korean international relations during this period can be considered a valid subject for academic research. What does it mean to discuss Korean international relations when the Korean people, deprived of a nation-state, could not orchestrate an independent diplomacy? And if we can speak of such relations, how do we define them? Recent studies on Korean history under Japanese colonial rule have gained much currency because of the prevailing nationalistic atmosphere in contemporary Korean academia. They typically wish to reestablish Korea's legitimacy by minimizing the role of alien, illegitimate rulers during this period. How, then, can we search for a “Korean perspective” in this study, given the fact that Korea's international relations were inherently dependent upon the great powers’ attitudes and policies, and the premise that the Korean peninsula was just a pawn in those policies? These are questions I have been pondering since I began this research. I hope what follows will provide some answers.