Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Glossary of terms and abbreviations
- Introduction
- I Evolution and outline
- II Components and boundaries
- III Effects
- 8 Intelligence and national action
- 9 International action
- 10 Intelligence and security
- 11 Intelligence threats
- 12 Intelligence cooperation
- IV Accuracy
- V Evaluation and management
- VI The 1990s and beyond
- VII Summary
- Suggestions for further reading
- Index
9 - International action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Glossary of terms and abbreviations
- Introduction
- I Evolution and outline
- II Components and boundaries
- III Effects
- 8 Intelligence and national action
- 9 International action
- 10 Intelligence and security
- 11 Intelligence threats
- 12 Intelligence cooperation
- IV Accuracy
- V Evaluation and management
- VI The 1990s and beyond
- VII Summary
- Suggestions for further reading
- Index
Summary
The last chapter discussed intelligence's effects on national action related to national interests. It also plays some part in arrangements geared to promoting international security, through unilateral and multilateral action and international treaties. This part can now be examined. International security is considered here only in its most limited sense, of avoiding wars or limiting them.
Security through states acting on or for others
Intelligence is drawn on for any kind of national action, including intervention in others’ conflicts or mediation between them with international security motives. The United States’ ability to intervene or mediate as a world guardian draws on its superpower intelligence, and depends significantly upon it. Good diplomatic intelligence probably helped Kissinger to pave the way for Arab–Israeli agreements after the Yom Kippur war, and President Carter to bring about the Camp David settlement. The same applies to other states acting as guarantors or brokers, like Britain in seeking a Cyprus settlement.
National intelligence itself can also be offered as part of mediations and guarantees. As part of the Yom Kippur war's ceasefire Kissinger offered to provide both sides with imagery from U-2 overflights of the disengagement area, as some safeguard against surprise attack. After the Sinai II Agreement in September 1975 this material was provided from U-2 sorties flown every seven to ten days at 70,000 feet, routinely or at Egyptian or Israeli request, over the neutral Buffer Zone and the Limited Force Zones.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Intelligence Power in Peace and War , pp. 156 - 164Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996
- 1
- Cited by