The change in targets for intelligence is dramatic. To be sure, for all the emphasis on terrorists and other nonstate (or transnational) targets, the change is hardly absolute. Intelligence dealt with nonstates before, and nation-states – such as North Korea, Iran, and China – still loom large in the work of U.S. intelligence. While some of those state targets, such as North Korea, are familiar in the sense that they resemble the secretive Soviet Union, others present different and unfamiliar – if not entirely new – challenges.

This chapter defines the change in targets, focusing on transnational targets such as terrorists. The change is widely acknowledged, yet its implications run far deeper than are usually recognized. The change goes to the heart of how intelligence does its business – from collection to analysis to dissemination, to use the labels that are increasingly less apt. Before turning to transnational targets, some discussion of remaining state targets is appropriate because those also cover a range. The chapter then details the challenges of transnational targets, concluding by illustrating some of the implications of that change with the issue of possible acquisition of WMD by terrorists.

THE RANGE OF STATE TARGETS

States will not only remain targets for intelligence; they will also remain, for all the competition from transnational actors – ranging from NGOs to international business, to drug lords and terrorists – the key actors in the international system. Thus, they will remain an important target for intelligence.