Book contents
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY: OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783–1793
- CHAPTER II THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY
- CHAPTER III THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1793
- CHAPTER IV THE WEST INDIES, 1793–1810
- CHAPTER V THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE
- CHAPTER VI THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VII THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VIII THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF TOULON IN 1793 TO THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT SEA, IN 1796, AND BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, IN FEBRUARY, 1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE
- CHAPTER IX THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798
- CHAPTER X THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801
- CHAPTER XI THE ATLANTIC, 1796–1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND
- Plate section
CHAPTER II - THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2011
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY: OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783–1793
- CHAPTER II THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY
- CHAPTER III THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1793
- CHAPTER IV THE WEST INDIES, 1793–1810
- CHAPTER V THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE
- CHAPTER VI THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VII THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VIII THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF TOULON IN 1793 TO THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT SEA, IN 1796, AND BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, IN FEBRUARY, 1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE
- CHAPTER IX THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798
- CHAPTER X THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801
- CHAPTER XI THE ATLANTIC, 1796–1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND
- Plate section
Summary
Before following the narrative of directly warlike action, or discussing the influence of the naval factor upon the military and political events, it is proper to examine the relative position, strength, and resources, of the rival nations, particularly in the matter of Sea Power,—to weigh the chances of the struggle, as it were, beforehand, from the known conditions,—to analyze and point out certain reasons why the sea war took the turn it did, in order that the experience of the past may be turned to the profit of the future.
First of all, it must be recognized that the problem to be thus resolved is by no means so simple as in most wars. It is not here a mere question of the extent, population, and geographical position of a country; of the number of its seamen, the tonnage of its shipping, the strength of its armed fleet; nor yet again, chiefly of the wealth and vigor of its colonies, the possession of good and well-placed maritime bases in different parts of the world; not even, at first hand, of the policy and character of its government, although it is undoubtedly true that in the action of French governments is to be found the chief reason for the utter disaster and overthrow which awaited the Sea Power of France. It was because the government so faithfully and necessarily reflected the social disorder, the crude and wild habits of thought which it was powerless to check, that it was incapable of dealing with the naval necessities of the day.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010First published in: 1893