Book contents
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY: OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783–1793
- CHAPTER II THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY
- CHAPTER III THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1793
- CHAPTER IV THE WEST INDIES, 1793–1810
- CHAPTER V THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE
- CHAPTER VI THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VII THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VIII THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF TOULON IN 1793 TO THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT SEA, IN 1796, AND BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, IN FEBRUARY, 1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE
- CHAPTER IX THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798
- CHAPTER X THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801
- CHAPTER XI THE ATLANTIC, 1796–1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND
- Plate section
CHAPTER XI - THE ATLANTIC, 1796–1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2011
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY: OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783–1793
- CHAPTER II THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY
- CHAPTER III THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1793
- CHAPTER IV THE WEST INDIES, 1793–1810
- CHAPTER V THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE
- CHAPTER VI THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VII THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT
- CHAPTER VIII THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF TOULON IN 1793 TO THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT SEA, IN 1796, AND BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, IN FEBRUARY, 1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE
- CHAPTER IX THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798
- CHAPTER X THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801
- CHAPTER XI THE ATLANTIC, 1796–1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND
- Plate section
Summary
The decision taken by the French executive in the latter part of 1795,—after the disastrous partial encounters of Martin with Hotham in the Mediterranean and of Villaret Joyeuse with Bridport in the Bay of Biscay,—to discontinue sending large fleets to sea, and to rely upon commerce-destroying, by single cruisers or small squadrons, to reduce the strength of Great Britain, remained unchanged during the following years, and was adopted by Bonaparte when the Consular government, in 1799, succeeded that of the Directory. This policy was in strict accord with the general feeling of the French nation, as well naval officers as unprofessional men, by which the action of the navy was ever subordinated to other military considerations, to “ulterior objects,” as the phrase commonly ran,—a feeling that could not fail to find favor and expression in the views of the great director of armies who ruled France during the first fourteen years of this century. It amounted, however, simply to abandoning all attempt to control the sea. Consequently, whenever any enterprise was undertaken which required this to be crossed, resort was necessarily had to evasion, more or less skilfully contrived; and success depended, not upon the reasonable certainty conferred by command of the water, by the skilful massing of forces, but upon a balance of chances, which might be more or less favorable in the particular instance, but could never be regarded as reaching the degree of se curity which is essential, even in the hazardous combinations of the game of war.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010First published in: 1893