Mass control was one of the most important components of the Thai state's counterinsurgency operations from the early 1960s. Building a loyal citizen base was the aim of state-sponsored mass organizations and popular mobilization. A solid popular base could not only be used against enemies of the state, but could serve as proof of khwam samakkhi, unity, mass support for the state against the alien communists. The sheer number of people and their royal nationalist activities confirmed the legitimacy of the state and the existing social order.

This chapter begins by tracing the operations of state-supported mass organizations during the anti-communist period from the 1960s to early 1980s, when several right-wing movements appeared. Some had good ties with ISOC and were involved in the massacre of students and activists at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976. Their activities and names gradually disappeared from public view after 1976. People tended to assume that the military and its rightist allies had ended the operation of mass organizations, and that the semi-democratic regimes of General Kriangsak Chamanan (October 1977–March 1980) and his successor General Prem Tinsulanonda (March 1980–August 1988) gave no importance to these organizations. Quite the opposite was true.

Despite the appalling reputation of the military-supported rightist militias as a result of the Thammasat massacre, the conservative elites never abandoned the mass control programme as it was still needed to perpetuate their political power. On the one hand, the establishment understood that the state had to retreat from an ultra-rightist position, which would only strengthen its leftist enemy. On the other hand, mass organizations took on new importance after the re-emergence of parliamentary politics from the late 1970s. The military embraced democratization as a new mission, but still saw popular control programmes as an essential element of protecting the country's internal security. This brilliant plan was shaped by the semidemocratic regimes of Kriangsak and Prem, without any awareness on the part of politicians, elected governments, and civil society.

This chapter evaluates the limitations or failures of the military's political offensive during the intense period of counter-communist warfare between the 1960s and the late 1970s.