There are a number of book-length studies on Indonesia’s foreign policy, of which very few have been published. Most of the books published can be divided into two broad categories: macro and micro studies. The macro studies (such as works by Franklin Weinstein, Anak Agung Gde Agung and Michael Leifer) deal largely with Indonesia’s foreign policy in general, while micro studies (by Jon M. Reinhardt, J.A.C. Mackie, David Mozingo, Dewi Fortuna Anwar and others) focus on specific topics and themes. Of these two types of studies, many cover the Sukarno period or early Suharto era. Particularly lacking are macro studies on Indonesia’s foreign policy under Suharto. The existing books which partially or wholly deal with Suharto were either published in the 1970s or early eighties. To my knowledge, there is no up-to-date book that examines comprehensively Indonesia’s foreign policy under Suharto. Undoubtedly there is an urgent case for such a book.

It is also worth noting that most of these books do not adopt a specific “theory” or model for examining Indonesia’s foreign policy and I have followed the same approach, although I am fully aware of the existence of these “theories” and models. An Indonesian case study such as mine is usually insufficient for generating a useful model. Nevertheless, the information provided in my study may contribute to future model-building on foreign policy behaviour.

Although no model has been used in the study, I have adopted a framework of foreign policy analysis. The framework provides a useful checklist of items required for a study of foreign policy, including the determinants of a country’s foreign policy behaviour.

In analysing Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Suharto era, however, it appears that the Indonesian military and culture (or political culture) are of crucial importance. The military, together with President Suharto, who was an army general, are initial decision-makers. Their policy tends to be influenced by prevalent political culture in terms of abangan (or nominal Muslim-cultural) orientations, and preference for authoritarianism. Nonetheless, it is clear that, in the later period, Suharto became more assertive in foreign policy. He has not always agreed with the military establishment on domestic politics as well as on foreign policy issues as illustrated by his handling of the East Timor issue, especially the recent Dili incident.