BRITISH BASTION

In 1824 Sir Stamford Raffles succeeded in effecting the transfer of the island of Singapore to the British East India Company. From that time on Singapore became the bastion of British domination of Asia. Fortification of the island had not been restricted by the Washington Naval Conference quotas of 1921-2, and Britain had subsequently spent many millions of pounds sterling making the defences “impregnable”. Since the outbreak of fighting in China in 1937 Britain had completed the naval port and further consolidated its strength with Australian and Indian soldiers. As an island, Singapore had natural defences as well. Britain boasted the fortress could never be captured by sea. There was, however, an Achilles heel noted by Japanese intelligence: the rear defences near Johore Bahru across the strait to the north. The British discounted the possibility of the Japanese Army reaching Singapore overland through the jungles of Thailand to approach from the rear. British military intelligence reports failed even to mention the lack of fortifications for the defence of Singapore to the rear until 19 January 1941. British strategy relied entirely on the defence of the sea-front, counting on Britain's traditional naval supremacy.

Prime Minister Churchill was dumbfounded to hear of the vulnerability of Singapore to the north. He telegraphed General Wavell, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific, on 20 January 1942, a month after the invasion of Malaya: “I want to make it absolutely clear that I expect every inch of ground to be defended, every scrap of material or defences to be blown to pieces to prevent capture by the enemy, and no question of surrender to be entertained until after protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore City.” But for Churchill there was an even more critical objective than holding Singapore, as he indicated in a communiqué to General Ismay the same day: keeping open the Burma Road as the avenue to Chinese troops, who had been more effective than any others against the Japanese. Despite Churchill's belated concern, however, little was done to strengthen the defences of Singapore to the north between 20 January and the night of 7 February when the first Japanese landing barges wove their way through dense mangrove swamps across the Johore Strait.

The pivotal point of the defences was the narrow causeway connecting Singapore with Johore Bahru to the rear.