In memory of Paul Hirst

The increase in the movement of people and problems across national borders has become a widely discussed topic in political theory, and theorists have put considerable effort into proposing institutions that might be able to cope with these changes. In these projects of institutional design, it is widely agreed, or at least assumed, that the more encompassing institutional arrangements are, the more difficulty these institutions will have in motivating strong commitment. A general description of this dilemma reads like this: In all the cases where the interests of individual or collective actors, no matter how they are defined and perceived, conflict with collective interests at a higher aggregate level or with more encompassing social, legal, or moral obligations, more encompassing solidarity and trust are necessary to overcome the multifarious collective action paradoxes revealed by a rational choice perspective or to overcome the weak motivational force of (or weakness of will with regard to) the more universal moral obligations demanded from a moral perspective. However, solidarity and trust presuppose normative or cultural integration, collective identity, and loyalty, all of which are assumed to be strong only “where the respective groups are small and homogeneous. The larger and more heterogeneous a group is, the harder they are to achieve” (Streeck 1998: 23, my translation). There is thus generally agreed to be a tradeoff between the inclusiveness of institutions and their ability to generate the broad support necessary for robust collective action.