In the previous chapter we noted a fundamental contradiction between new norms of human rights in the United Nations Charter, and the lack of a UN human rights court to enforce them. As we saw, new human rights goals were proclaimed in 1945, and many human rights treaties were subsequently adopted. But apparently one was to rely mostly on traditional diplomacy, grounded in state sovereignty, to realize them. This meant that realist principles of state interest loomed large. In this chapter we examine more closely the evolving process for applying universal human rights standards on a global basis. We inquire whether there is now more commitment to liberalism, as shown through institutionalized procedures to protect human rights.

International law has traditionally been clearer about “What?” than “Who?” The law has emphasized what legal rules apply in different situations. It has frequently not explicitly addressed who is authorized to make authoritative judgments about legal compliance. By default this means that states remain judge and jury in conflicts involving themselves – a principle accepted by no well-ordered society. Certainly the global law on human rights and humanitarian affairs has been characterized by decentralized decision making leading to much ambiguity about compliance. As this author concluded some time ago, “Most states, in negotiating human rights agreements, do not want authoritative international means of protection.” Many states have asserted an apparently liberal commitment to internationally recognized human rights.