2 - Nature's otherness
Summary
Introduction
What is the otherness view of nature's value that I have been referring to? Before going on to make the political connections I have in mind, it will be necessary to discuss the main elements of the otherness view. That is what follows in this chapter. I will clarify the otherness view partly by distinguishing it from some apparently similar views, as well as some that are more definitely different. I will also discuss some of the difficulties involved in keeping nature's otherness clearly in focus. Towards the end of the chapter I discuss what seems to be the most appropriate way to understand the concept of the value to be attached to nature in virtue of its otherness. First of all, though, it seems important to point out that nature's otherness is not a wholly unfamiliar basis for its value. It would not be right to think of it as the basis for a revolutionary perspective, or as requiring an entirely new environmental ethic. Much of the spirit of the otherness-based view is expressed, for example, in these comments by John Passmore:
the philosopher has to learn to live with the “strangeness” of nature, with the fact that natural processes are entirely indifferent to our existence and welfare – not positively indifferent, of course, but incapable of caring about us – and are complex in a way that rules out the possibility of our wholly mastering and transforming them. So expressed, these conclusions seem so trite and obvious that one is almost ashamed to set them out. […]
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- Information
- How to be a Green LiberalNature, Value and Liberal Philosophy, pp. 18 - 56Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2003