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8 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 August 2009

Ivan Arreguín-Toft
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
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Summary

The vast majority of wars do not come into the heavyweight range, but are distinguished more by their duration and bitterness than their weaponry. In a way they become more amenable to Western intervention when they do develop into straightforward clashes between regular forces. Civil wars, involving irregular fighters and skirmishes in the streets, with political confusion rife and good intelligence at a premium, present an appalling prospect to outsiders. Decisive victories are few and far between. Even success can mean a long-term commitment of troops to sustain an uneasy peace.

Freedman

This book began with a puzzle. How do the weak win wars? Through a combination of statistical tests and the tracing of causal logic through historical case studies, I have shown that weak actors – in this case mainly states – win wars against much stronger adversaries when they are able to adopt and maintain an ideal counterstrategy. Strategy, in other words, can multiply or divide applied power.

Strong actors come to a fight with a complex combination of interests, forces, doctrine, military technology, and political objectives, but because armed forces are thought to be versatile in their employment, and because strong actors are only relatively, not absolutely, strong, strong actors do have choices in the strategies they use. Similarly, weak actors often face constraints in their choice of strategies, but strategy is never endogenous.

Type
Chapter
Information
How the Weak Win Wars
A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict
, pp. 200 - 227
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • Conclusion
  • Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: How the Weak Win Wars
  • Online publication: 22 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521645.009
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  • Conclusion
  • Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: How the Weak Win Wars
  • Online publication: 22 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521645.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: How the Weak Win Wars
  • Online publication: 22 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521645.009
Available formats
×