The potential strength of Tsar Peter’s Russia as proven to the rest of Europe by territorial conquest over Sweden, the dominant power of the Baltic, forced other nations to take Russia seriously. When Peter met William III at Utrecht in 1697, there was no expectation that Russia would soon eclipse Sweden in the Baltic. Keeping Russia as a friend for the purpose of trade was the objective, with Russia at that time not even in possession of a Baltic port. As Russia’s stature grew, helped greatly by the creation of a powerful blue-water navy capable of subduing the might of the Swedish navy, the British government had to reassess its own strategic position with regard to the nature of its relationship with Russia. Was it possible that the Russian Empire, and Tsar Peter, was less of a friend and now more of a threat? In replacing Sweden as the dominant power in the Baltic, it was Russia that was beginning to control the naval stores trade, leading to the possibility that through her navy, a force gifted with so much technical expertise by British subjects, the existing balance of power in that region might at some point be completely destroyed. If that came about, and it was clearly possible if Russia continued to grow her navy and further her territorial ambitions, a stranglehold could be placed upon Britain’s own navy through Russia using her position, should enmity arise, to deny the right of British merchants to enter the Baltic and purchase those all-important naval stores. In such a situation, the Royal Navy would be seriously hampered, leaving the British shoreline bereft of its first line of defence and British merchant ships unable to put to sea with regularity.

The Fortunes of War

Upon Peter’s return to Moscow in September 1698, the Tsar had to confront several setbacks. First an acceptance that his mission abroad had not met with full success, failing to bring into the war against the Ottoman Empire either Britain or the Netherlands.