This discussion seeks to compare, in very brief compass, a current radical argument for connectionism and a radical argument against. It is not clear that the very same version of connectionism is defended by Smolensky as is attacked by Fodor, but since I do not bring the two arguments directly in contact, that will not matter. My own inconclusive view is that the jury is still out, and there is no pressing need at the moment to believe what Smolensky says, though one may respect it and be stimulated by it, nor to reject the whole thing on the grounds Fodor gives. One can legitimately be, in a narrow and strict sense, an agnostic, without giving that word the force of active disbelief it is often made to carry.

Smolensky

Smolensky (this volume) declines to base his version of connectionism on the brain: on the supposed analogy of the brain to connectionist networks, and for this all critics must give much thanks. Connectionism for him must stand or fall on its own merits as a model of processing and behavior, and not on gross and randomly drawn similarities with natural phenomena, similarities that cannot be assessed in any scientific manner, but which either appeal or fail to do so, depending on the mood of the audience.