It seems that the Cyrenaics did not have detailed linguistic and semantic views. However, the Sextus passage (T6b) cited in the previous chapter (pp. 89–90) indicates that some Cyrenaic positions are relevant to language. These are the following: (i) the pathē are private; (ii) nobody has access to the pathē of anyone else: in that sense the pathē are incommunicable; (iii) there is no common criterion, which on one interpretation entails that no proposition is evidently true of an object or state of affairs in the world, but on another interpretation (outlined at the end of the previous chapter) entails that we cannot establish truths about shared experiences. On the other hand, (iv) the onomata which we use are koina, commonly shared; also, the text suggests that (v) there is a disparity between the lack of a common criterion and the use of commonly shared onomata. The point appears to be that, when I and my neighbour both use the word ‘white’ in relation to the same thing, we tend to assume that the content of our pathē is qualitatively identical; yet we should not assume this, because of (i), (ii) and (iii).

In what follows, I shall first specify what the expression ‘common names’ (koina onomata) may mean, what entities are ‘the things’ designated by these ‘names’, and what semantic relation is indicated by the statement that common names are ‘assigned’ (tithesthai) to things.