In the two subsequent chapters, I shall turn to the parallels drawn by ancient authors between the Cyrenaic position on the one hand, and the doctrines of Epicurus and of Protagoras in Plato's Theaetetus on the other hand. My aim is to show where the Cyrenaic position approaches certain varieties of empiricism and relativism, and also where it diverges from either of these positions. If this is achieved, we may reach a better understanding of the bounds and limitations of the Cyrenaic doctrine.

I shall start with Plutarch [T1], who raises the issue of the relation between Cyrenaic scepticism and Epicurean empiricism. Plutarch's testimony [T1] consists of two parts. In chapter 6 I discussed the first part of the testimony (1120c–f), in which Colotes comes out as an unreliable and even malicious historian, but as a good philosopher. This picture changes in the second part of Plutarch's passage (1120f–1121e), in which Colotes is accused of philosophical naivety on two accounts. First, Plutarch maintains that Colotes fails to see that he is attacking the very tenets which, as an Epicurean, he is bound to endorse.