This chapter arises out of a realisation that was articulated by many at the original colloquium: namely the realisation that the subject of dialogue in the ancient world is richly over-determined and prone to manifold interference. As a test case for thinking ‘dialogue’ in Greek prose before Plato, I take as my example one of the most famous dialogues in Greek literature: Thucydides' ‘Melian dialogue’ (History 5.85–113). In offering yet another reading of the Melian dialogue, I will suggest that both the dialogue and critical literature on the dialogue illustrate the pitfalls inherent in ‘doing dialogue’ as a comparative project in the modern academy.

INTERFERING IN DIALOGUE

The first source of interference is a lexical one: in invoking dialogue we invoke a term with a broad semantic range. The OED gives two meanings for dialogue: the primary meaning is ‘a conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk together’ (1a), with the additional shades of meaning ‘a verbal interchange of thought … a conversation’ (1b) and, in politics, ‘discussion or diplomatic contact between the representatives of two nations, groups or the like’ (1c). This latter usage yields the general use of dialogue to denote ‘valuable or constructive discussion or communication’. This cluster of meanings is further complicated by the secondary meaning of dialogue: (2a) ‘a literary work in the form of a conversation between two or more persons’, and (2b) ‘literary composition of this nature’.