During the last two decades, the theory of secularisation has been the subject of critical discussion by doubters, sceptics and open adversaries. Historians and sociologists who claim no longer to accept the theory, at least in its classic form, have created a valuable body of alternative scholarship. Simon Green is correct in his observation that ‘It is the anti-secularisation model which has made most of the running in recent British religious historiography.’ But in surveying the debate I remain impressed with the sturdy durability, abiding persuasiveness and rhetorical usefulness of the theory of secularisation. Green also commented that various ‘counter-theories … taken together … are something less than entirely persuasive’. Despite the efforts of doubters, sceptics and adversaries, the most influential general account of religion in modern Europe, and in the modern world, remains the theory of secularisation. Why?

It is important not to underestimate the extent to which secularisation continues to be invoked uncritically. Upon occasion I encounter the assertion that no one believes in secularisation any more. Jay Demerath, an American sociologist of religion, recently put it even more emphatically: ‘for a long time there was a notion that society would just become secularised over time, that this was part of modernisation and westernisation, and that religion would disappear due to the legacy of the Enlightenment. I don't know any sociologists of religion worth their salt who really believed that.’