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6 - Central Bank Independence

Can It Survive a Crisis?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2015

Owen F. Humpage
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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Current Federal Reserve Policy Under the Lens of Economic History
Essays to Commemorate the Federal Reserve System's Centennial
, pp. 126 - 150
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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