I am trying to study the dynamics of Eastern European reforms as an outcome of political actions by domestic leaders under pressure of EU membership conditionality. These developments suggest the need for a cross-level analysis of EU institutions and Eastern European leaders as the primary actors in the political theater. Ample evidence exists in favor of claims, raised by institutionalist authors, that the highly structured EU imposes strict constraints on its leaders as well as member countries. However, a different approach tailored for a loosely institutionalized Eastern European decision-making environment is needed (see, for instance, the tabula rasa argument of Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998). In these societies, traditionally low regard for institutions and the highly personalistic political style of communist elites suggest that the main actors in reforming postsocialist countries are not institutions but leaders as rational actors with clear power-driven interests.

Epistemologically, the assumed rationality of the Eastern European leaders derives directly from methodological rationalism. “Leaders' interest in attaining and maintaining power” means that reforms that improve their chances for power are preferable to reforms that do not, and the latter are preferable to reforms that hurt their chances for power. Even though this view simplifies leaders' human nature, it reflects powerful assumptions about their motivations, especially in loosely institutionalized societies, where domestic norms are scarce and leaders' appropriation of certain political behavior, as proponed by international organizations, might not have occurred and/or been consolidated yet.

Assuming EU motives behind policy preferences requires more elaboration.