Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Cognitive radio communications and cooperation
- 1 Introduction to cognitive radios
- 2 Game theory for cognitive radio networks
- 3 Markov models for dynamic spectrum allocation
- 4 Repeated open spectrum sharing games
- 5 Pricing games for dynamic spectrum allocation
- 6 A multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction game
- 7 Evolutionary cooperative spectrum sensing games
- 8 Anti-jamming stochastic games
- 9 Opportunistic multiple access for cognitive networks
- Part II Resource awareness and learning
- Part III Securing mechanism and strategies
- References
- Index
6 - A multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction game
from Part I - Cognitive radio communications and cooperation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Cognitive radio communications and cooperation
- 1 Introduction to cognitive radios
- 2 Game theory for cognitive radio networks
- 3 Markov models for dynamic spectrum allocation
- 4 Repeated open spectrum sharing games
- 5 Pricing games for dynamic spectrum allocation
- 6 A multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction game
- 7 Evolutionary cooperative spectrum sensing games
- 8 Anti-jamming stochastic games
- 9 Opportunistic multiple access for cognitive networks
- Part II Resource awareness and learning
- Part III Securing mechanism and strategies
- References
- Index
Summary
Spectrum auction is one important approach for dynamic spectrum allocation, in which secondary users lease some unused bands from primary users. However, spectrum auctions are different from existing auctions studied by economists, because spectrum resources are interference-limited rather than quantity-limited, and it is possible to award one band to multiple secondary users with negligible mutual interference. To accommodate this special feature in wireless communications, in this chapter, we present a novel multi-winner spectrum auction game that does not not exist in the auction literature. Since secondary users may be selfish in nature and tend to be dishonest in pursuit of higher profits, we develop effective mechanisms to suppress their dishonest/collusive behaviors when secondary users distort their valuations about spectrum resources and interference relationships. Moreover, in order to make the game scalable when the size of the problem grows, the semi-definite programming (SDP) relaxation is applied to reduce the complexity significantly. Finally, simulation results are presented in order to evaluate the auction mechanisms, and to demonstrate the reduction in complexity.
Introduction
With the development of cognitive radio technologies, dynamic spectrum access has become a promising approach. This allows unlicensed users (secondary users) dynamic and opportunistic access to the licensed bands owned by legacy spectrum holders (primary users) in either a non-cooperative fashion or a cooperative fashion.
In non-cooperative dynamic spectrum sharing, secondary users' existence is transparent to primary users, and secondary users frequently have to sense the radio environment to detect the presence of primary users.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Cognitive Radio Networking and SecurityA Game-Theoretic View, pp. 155 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010