Since the publication of the Investigations, Wittgenstein's ideas have exerted a great influence on the philosophy of the social sciences. Keynes was one of the first to feel this influence, and his use of the analysis of combinatory vagueness to defend the efficiency of ordinary language in formulating social theory is one of the most novel applications of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Keynes analysis of samples informed his views not only on the nature of concepts, but also his understanding of the nature of models in the social sciences. I now turn to look at why he believed models too were samples rather than generalizations.

Keynes often addressed the issue of why the social and natural sciences employ different methods. Many of the arguments he used in making this distinction are not novel, being similar to those pressed by philosophers of hermeneutics. He made much of the point, for example, that human action is meaningful and thus that social explanation requires an empathetic understanding of the thoughts and expectations of the social actors; and this requirement, he found, entailed his view on concept formation, for “as soon as one is dealing with the influence of expectations and of transitory experience, one is, in the nature of things, outside the realm of the formally exact.” He thus made a familiar hermeneutic case for conceptual adequacy. But what distinguishes his position from others is that he argued for this requirement largely on grounds of theoretical economy, and only in a cursory way on the basis of an ontological difference between nature and society.