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Part III - Incentives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2021

Benjamin van Rooij
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Amsterdam
D. Daniel Sokol
Affiliation:
University of Florida
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Print publication year: 2021

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References

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