In addition to being the last chapter of the book, this chapter is also the sketchiest. In Section A, I maintain that Hume's explanations of morality and human behavior are superior to Hutcheson's and the rationalists'. In B, I present four features that I think are distinctive of all accounts that are rightly called “Humean” and point to some of the negative and positive implications that set of features has for moral philosophy. In C, I raise the question of whether Humean accounts debunk or undermine morality. And in D, I hold that a fifth distinctive feature of Humean accounts is the belief that Humean explanations do not necessarily debunk or undermine morality and that this belief is eminently plausible. I do not, however, provide anything like a thorough account or defense of these claims. My aim in this chapter is only to give a rough idea of the philosophical territory I think we come to after we have traveled from Whichcote and Cudworth, through Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, to Hume – a territory I point toward but whose exploration would mark the end of this study and the beginning of another.

The Superiority of Hume's Explanations

Hume's explanations of morality and human behavior are superior to Hutcheson's. Hume's nuanced views of the complex of concerns underlying justice and the different types of qualities we judge to be virtuous capture what we do and say more accurately than Hutcheson's attempt to account for all the phenomena in terms of benevolence.